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MURDER MITIGATION IN THE FIFTY-TWO 
AMERICAN JURISDICTIONS: A CASE STUDY IN 
DOCTRINAL INTERRELATION ANALYSIS 
Paul H. Robinson • 
Abstract 
This Essay surveys the law in the fifty-two American jurisdictions with 
regard to the three doctrines that commonly provide a mitigation or defense to 
murder liability: common-law provocation and its modern counterpart, 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance; the so-called diminished capacity 
defense and its modern counterpart, mental illness negating an offense 
element; and the insanity defense. The essay then examines the patterns 
among the jurisdictions in the particular formulation they adopt for the three 
doctrines and the combinations in which those formulations commonly appear 
in different jurisdictions. After this review, the essay steps back to see what 
kinds of general conclusions can be drawn from the patterns that the survey 
reveals. The methodology offers a case study in the kinds of insights to be 
gained from such doctrinal interrelation analysis: insights about not only the 
doctrines at hand, but also about the lawmaking process that produced them. 
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Three doctrines operate to provide mental- or emotional-based mitigations 
or excuses in homicide cases. First, the common-law provocation mitigation 
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reduces murder to manslaughter, as does its broader modern incarnation, the 
mitigation for extreme mental or emotional disturbance (EMED).1 Second, the 
"diminished capacity'' defense can provide a mitigation or, in some 
jurisdictions, a complete defense, if the offender's mental illness negates-
makes it impossible to prove that the offender had-a required offense 
culpability element? This doctrine is also referred to, more accurately and 
usefully, as mental illness negating an offense element (MINOE).3 Finally, the 
insanity defense can provide a complete excuse depending upon the effects of 
an offender's mental illness at the time of the offense.4 
This brief Essay reviews these doctrines, their various formulations, and 
their adoption in the fifty-two American jurisdictions.5 One goal is to get a 
clear view of the legal landscape in the area. With fifty-two jurisdictions, too 
many of us are left to guess or to rely upon the existing common wisdom on the 
issue. Beyond that, however, the study introduces a methodology that might be 
useful in a variety of contexts: comparing the pattern of interrelation of a 
doctrine's adoption in different states and the pattern of adoption of different 
but related doctrines within the same state.6 The approach has the potential to 
tell us not only something about the doctrines at hand, but also something about 
the lawmaking process that produced them. 
I. THE DOCTRINES & THEIR POPULARJTY 
Each of the three doctrines appears in a variety of formulations in the 
states. The analysis in Part I reviews the approach of each state on each 
doctrine and groups together states with similar approaches.7 In the three tables 
below, the first column summarizes the various approaches, arranged from the 
narrowest at the bottom to the broadest at the top (broadest in the sense of 
providing a mitigation or excuse to the greatest number of cases). The second 
column in each table describes the kinds of cases that are added by the category 
over the more-narrow category immediately below it. So, for example, Table 
I ' s row 4 adds control impairment to the scope of the defense in row 3. The 
final column, on the far right of each table, identifies the states that take that 
approach. Each category groups together formulations of similar overall effect, 
although the formulations may be different in many minor respects. The table 
I . See sources cited infra Appendix Table, column 4. 
2. See sources cited infra Appendix Table, column 3. 
3. PAUL H. ROBINSON, Abnormal Mental State Mitigations of Murder-the U. S. Perspective, in Loss 
OF CONTROL AND DIMINJSHED RESPONSIDILITY: DOMESTIC, COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVES :09 1, 296 (Alan Reed & Michael Bohlander eds., 2011 ), available at http://papers.ssrn .com/ 
sol3/papers.r fm ?abstract_ id= 167680 I . 
4. See sources cited infra Appendix Table, column 2. 
5. These inc lude the fifty states p lus the District of Columbia and the federal system. See infra 
Appendix Table. 
6. See infra Part Il.A-D. 
7. See infra Part l.A-B. 
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categorizations are drawn from statutory and, where that is lacking, caselaw 
authorities, which are collected in the Citation Table in the Appendix. 
A. A Survey of American Jurisdictions 
As to the first doctrine, six states have abolished the general excuse of 
insanity.8 Twenty-one states follow the most common approach and recognize 
the defense, but with the most narrow formulation of the common-law 
M'Naghten test, which requires that the actor not know the nature of his 
conduct or that it is wrong.9 Eight more states and the federal system keep with 
this approach of allowing the defense only for a purely cognitive dysfunction, 
but broaden the test somewhat by allowing it if the actor could not fully 
"appreciate" the criminality of his conduct, an approach taken from the Model 
Penal Code's formulation of the cognitive prong for the defense.10 The 
remaining sixteen jurisdictions go beyond this to recognize some form of a 
control prong, which allows the defense even if an actor appreciates the 
criminality of his conduct but is unable to control it. 11 This is the Model Penal 
8. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 21-5209 (West 2014) ("It shall be a defense to a prosecution under 
any statute that the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked the culpable mental state required 
as an element of the crime charged. Mental disease or defect is not otheiWise a defense."); NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN.§ 174.035 (West 2013) ("A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, guilty but mentally ill or, with the 
consent of the court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally 
ill."); Finger v. State, 27 P .3d 66,78 (Nev. 2001) (en bane) ("No act committed by a person while in a state of 
insanity or voluntary intoxication shall be deemed less criminal by reason of his condition, but whenever the 
actual existence of any particular purpose, motive or intent is a necessary element to constitute a particular 
species or degree of crime, the fact of his insanity or intoxication may be taken into consideration in 
determining the purpose, motive or intent."). 
9. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN.§ 16-3-2 (West 2014) ("A person shall not be found guilty of a crime if, at 
the time of the act, omission, or negligence constituting the crime, the person did not have mental capacity to 
distinguish between right and wrong in relation to such act, omission, or negligence."); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2C:4-I (West 2014) ("A person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of such conduct 
he was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality 
of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong."); Price v. 
Commonwealth, 323 S.E.2d 106, 109 (Va. 1984); Herbin v. Commonwealth, 503 S.E.2d 226, 230 (Va. Ct. 
App. 1998) ("[T]he actual M'Naghten test for insanity, stated in the disjunctive, is the rule in 
Virginia."). Under the M 'Naghten test "it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the committing of the 
act, the party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know 
the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what 
was wrong." Price, 323 S.E.2d at I 09 (quoting M'Naghten Case, (1843) 8 Eng. Rep. 7 18 (P.C.) 722-23). 
I 0. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (2013)("It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal 
statute that, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a 
severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his 
acts. Mental disease or defect does not otheiWise constitute a defense."); ALA. CODE§ 13A-3-l (a)(20 14) ("It 
is an affirmative defense to a prosecution for any crime that, at the time of the commission of the acts 
constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate 
the nature and quality or wrongfulness of his acts."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. II ,§ 40\(a)(West 2007 & Supp. 
2012) ("In any prosecution for an offense, it is an affirmative defense that, at the time of the conduct charged, 
as a result of mental illness or serious mental disorder, the accused lacked substantial capacity to appreciate 
the wrongfulness of the accused's conduct."). 
II. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 480\(a)(l) (West 2014) ("A person is not responsible for 
criminal conduct if at the time of the criminal conduct, as a result of mental illness or deficiency, he lacked 
22 TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:19 
Code approach. 12 The table below shows the specific jurisdictions that are part 
of each group. 13 
Table 1. Insanity Formulations 
Control impairment 
reciation 
Does not know 
AR, CT, DC, HI, KY, 
MD, MA, MI, NH, 
NM, OR, RI, VT, VA, 
WV, WY,MPC 
AL, AK, DE, Federal, 
IL, IN, ME, NY, TN 
AZ, CA, CO, FL, GA, 
lA, LA, MN, MS, MO, 
NE, NJ, NC, OH, OK, 
P A, SC, SD, TX, WA, 
WI 
ID, KS, MT, NV, ND, 
UT 
As to the second doctrine, while it is often referred to as the "diminished 
capacity" or "partial insanity" defense, it is nothing of the sort. In fact, it is just 
the reverse: rather than providing a defense, in most jurisdictions it imputes to 
an actor a required offense culpability element that he does not in fact have by 
barring the introduction of mental illness evidence that would negate the 
required element. 14 In sixteen states, no offense culpability element of any kind 
may be negated by evidence of mental illness. 15 Thirteen states permit mental 
substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the 
requirements of law."), amended by 2014 Vt. Laws No. !58 (H. 555); WYO. STAT. ANN.§ 7-ll-304(a) (West 
2014) ("A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental 
disease or defect he or she lacks adequate capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his or her conduct or 
to conform his or her conduct to the requirements of law."); Howard v. United States, 954 A.2d 415, 420 
(D.C. 2008) ("To establish a prima facie case of insanity, the defendant must present sufficient evidence to 
show that at the time of the criminal conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacked substantial 
capacity to recognize the wrongfulness of his act or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law." 
(quoting Patton v. United States, 782 A.2d 305, 312 (D.C. 200 I) (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
12. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 4.0 1 (1962). 
13 . New Hampshire is included in the group with the broadest formulation but goes beyond the Model 
Penal Code approach to allow the defense whenever the offense is the product of the mental illness. SeeN .H. 
REV. STAT. ANN . § 628:2 (2014); see also State v. Labranche, 942 A.2d 1284, 1286-87 (N.H. 2008) 
(interpreting the statute to allow a defense when defendants "suffered from a mental illness and that the crime 
charged was a product of that illness"). Virginia is included in the control-prong group (4) because, while it 
defines insaniry using the M 'Naghten standard, it has a separate "irresistible impulse" defense that essentially 
adds a narrow control prong to the insanity defense. See Herbin, 503 S.E.2d at 230. 
14. See inji-a notes 15-16 and accompanying text. 
IS. See, e.g. , State v. Mon, 931 P.2d 1046, 1050 (Ariz. 1997)(en banc)("Arizona's criminal code was 
based on the Model Penal Code. The 1962 version of the Model Penal Code allowed the admission of 
' [e]vidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect ... whenever it [was] relevant to 
prove that the defendant did or did not have a state of mind that is an element of the offense.' This section 
was written in recognition of the existence of 'degrees of mental disease or defect that fall short of that 
required for invoking the defense of irresponsibility, but that may be put in evidence as tending to show that 
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illness to negate only a specific intent. 16 Only twenty-three jurisdictions, a 
minority of the fifty-two, take the Model Penal Code approach of allowing 
mental illness evidence to negate any element. 17 Here are the specific 
jurisdictions that take each approach. 
the defendant lacked the specific mens rea required for the commission of the offense charged.' The 
legislature 's decision not to adopt this section of the Model Penal Code evidences its rejection of the use of 
psychological testimony to. challenge the mens rea element of a crime." (alterations in original) (citations 
omitted)) ; State v. Jones, 359 So. 2d 95, 98 (La. 1978) ("Louisiana is among the minority of eleven states that 
still reject the defense [diminished responsibility] in all aspects. In Louisiana, a mental defect or di sorder, 
short of legal insanity (i.e., the incapability to distinguish between right and wrong, La.R.S. 14:14), cannot 
serve to negate the specific intent and reduce the degree of the crime."); Gill v. State, 552 S.E.2d 26, 32 (S.C. 
200 1) ("The diminished capacity doctrine allows a defendant to offer evidence of his mental condition with 
respect to his capacity to achieve the mens rea required for the commission of the offense charged. In 
particular, the defense may be invoked to negate specific intent, where such intent is an element of the offense 
charged. Diminished capacity differs from the insanity defense in that it may be raised by a defendant who 
has conceded to be legally sane. The trial judge did not err by refusing to charge diminished capacity because 
it is not recognized in South Carolina." (citations omitted)). 
16. See, e.g., Anfinson v. State, 758 N.W.2d 496, 502 (Iowa 2008) ('"The diminished responsibility 
defense allows a defendant to negate the specific intent element of a crime by demonstrating due to some 
mental defect she did not have the capacity to forrn that specific intent."); State v. Balderama, 2004-NMSC-
008, 135 N.M. 329, 88 P.3d 845 ("Thus, we conclude that evidence of the condition of the mind of the 
accused at the time of the crime may be introduced, not only for the purpose of proving the inability to 
deliberate, but also to prove that the conditions were such that Defendant did not in fact, at the time of the 
killing, forrn a deliberate intent to kill." (emphasis omitted)); Commonwealth v. Spotz,47 A .3d 63, 90 (Pa. 
20 12) ("A diminished capacity defense does not exculpate the defendant from criminal liability entirely, but 
instead negates the element of specific intent."); State v. Amazeen, 526 A.2d 1268, 1271 (R.I. 1987) ("By 
adopting the diminished-capacity defense, we thus expanded the rule enunciated in Vanasse ... to allow 
evidence that a defendant's mental capacity was diminished by reasons other than intoxication to negate the 
proof of specific intent requ ired to convict a defendant of certain offenses, i fthose offenses included lesser, 
general-intent crimes of which the defendant could be convicted instead. Hence, evidence of trauma or 
mental disease not quite amounting to legal insanity may now be introduced, as intoxication always could, to 
defend one charged with a specific-intent crime."). 
17. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.020(a) (2012) ("Evidence that the defendant suffered from a 
mental disease or defect is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant did or did not have a 
culpable mental state which is an element of the crime."); HAW. REV. STAT. § 704-401 (West 2014) 
("Evidence that the defendant was affected by a phys ical or mental disease, disorder, or defect is admissible 
whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant did or did not have a state of mind that is required to 
establish an element of the offense."); State v. Messier, 497 A.2d 740, 743 (Vt. 1985) ("Evidence ofl"ered by a 
defendant to prove such a mental disease or defect may or may not also operate to disprove the existence of 
mental states, such as intent or premeditation, which might be essential elements of the crime."). 
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Table 2. MINOE Formulations 
Negate knowing, reckless, or 
negligent 
Negate intent (or premeditation) 
[Vol. 47:19 
AK, AR, CO, CT, 
Federal, HI, ID, IN, KS, 
ME, MD, MO, MT, NV, 
NH, NJ, OH, OR, TN, 
UT, VT, WA, WV, MPC 
CA, IA, KY, MA, NE, 
NY, NC, ND, NM, PA, 
RJ WY 
AL, AZ, DE, DC, FL, 
GA, IL, LA, MN, Ml, 
MS, OK, SC, TX, VA, 
WI 
As to the third doctrine, a large majority of jurisdictions-forty of the 
fifty-two--reject the Model Penal Code's attempt to broaden the common-law 
provocation defense, which typically mitigates murder to manslaughter. 18 The 
remaining dozen states adopt the third doctrine by statutory formulation based 
upon the Model Penal Code-giving a mitigation for a killing under "extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance"19 -although eight of those states drop the 
reference to "mental" and look only to "emotional disturbance."20 Here are the 
specific jurisdictions. 
18. See. e.g., IOWA CODE ANN.§ 707.4 (West 20 14) ("A person commits voluntary manslaughter when 
that person causes the death of another person, under circumstances which would otherwise be murder, if the 
person causing the death acts solely as the result of sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from 
serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a person and there is not an interval between the 
provocation and the killing in which a person of ordinary reason and temperament would regain control and 
suppress the impulse to kill. "); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 21-5404(a)(l) (West 2014) ("Voluntary manslaughter is 
knowingly killing a human being committed: (I) Upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion ... . "); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN.§ 2903.03(A) (West 2006). The voluntary manslaughter statute reads, "No person, whi le 
under the influence of sudden passion or in a sudden fit of rage, either of which is brought on by serious 
provocation occasioned by the victim that is reasonably sufficient to incite the person into using deadly force, 
shall knowingly cause the death of another or the unlawful termination of another's pregnancy." OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2903 .03(A). Several states appear to allow provocation to be a complete defense if it qualifies 
as "excusable homicide." See, e.g. , CAL. PENAL CODE§ 195 (West 2014); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 782.03 (West 
2007); People v. Hampton, 273 P. 854, 855-56 (Cal. Ct. App. 1929); Radillo v. State, 582 So. 2d 634, 636 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). 
19. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT.§ 707-702(2) (West 2014)("In a prosecution for murder or attempted 
murder in the first and second degrees it is an affirmative defense, which reduces the offense to manslaughter 
or attempted manslaughter, that the defendant was, at the time the defendant caused the death of the other 
person, under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable 
explanation. The reasonableness of the explanation shall be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable 
person in the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be."); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 630:2(1)(a) 
(2014) ("A person is guilty of manslaughter when he causes the death of another: (a) Under the influence of 
extreme mental or emotional disturbance caused by extreme provocation but which would otherwise 
constitute murder. . .. "). 
20. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-I0-104(a)(l)(A) (West & Supp. 2013) ("A person commits 
manslaughter if: (I )(A) The person causes the death of another person under circumstances that would be 
murder, except that he or she causes the death under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which 
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Table 3. Provocation/EMED Formulations 
B. Discussion 
AR, CT, DE, KY, NY, 
ND,OR, UT 
AL, AK, AZ, CA, CO, 
DC, Federal, FL, GA, ID, 
IL, IN, lA, KS, LA, ME, 
MD, MA, MI, MN, MS, 
MO, NE, NJ, NM, NC, 
OH, OK, P A, RI, SC, 
SD, TN, TX, VT, VA, 
W WV WY 
Two striking conclusions come from these displays. First, there is 
enormous variation in the formulation of the three doctrines across the fifty-two 
jurisdictions. It is not the case that a majority rule exists with outliers. Instead, 
we see large groups of states taking significantly different approaches than 
other large groups. And this is true even though, as noted above, each of the 
three or four categorizations used in a table group together formulations, among 
which, there is some variation. That is, the tables understate the degree of 
variation, yet still show enormous diversity. 
Also look at Table 7 below. The states that take the same approach to the 
three doctrines are marked in the right-hand column with the same 
letter. 21 That column shows that there are at least eighteen different patterns of 
formulation (A through R) of these three doctrines into the general groupings.22 
A second conclusion-that at least this writer finds striking- is the level 
of stinginess of most states in the excuses and mitigations they offer. Recall 
that during the 1960s and 1970s, three-quarters of the states codified or 
recodified their criminal law based in some significant part on the Model Penal 
Code, which was promulgated by the American Law Institute in 1962.23 Yet, 
there is reasonable excuse."); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20(2) (McKinney 2009) ("A person is guilty of 
manslaughter in the first degree when . . . With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the 
death of such person or of a third person under circumstances which do not constitute murder because he acts 
under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, as defined in paragraph (a) of subdivision one of 
section 125.25. The fact that homicide was committed under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance 
constitutes a mitigating circumstance reducing murder to manslaughter in the first degree and need not be 
proved in any prosecution initiated under this subdivision."). 
21. See infra Table 7. 
22. See infra Table 7. There are 4x4x3 possible combinations of approaches to the three doctrines, 
which equals forty-eight possibilities, so things theoretically could have been even more scattered. 
23 . See, e.g. , Herbert Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The Model Penal 
Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1425, 1427- 28 (1968). 
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this highly influential Model Code apparently had limited effect in gaining 
adherence to its formulations of these three doctrines, which were noticeably 
broader than earlier formulations.Z4 As the tables show, the Model Code's 
broader formulations represent a minority in every instance.25 Only one 
jurisdiction of the fifty-two, Hawaii, adopts the Model Penal Code's 
formulations on all three doctrines.Z6 
Even states that follow the Model Penal Code on many other issues, 
including the formulation of homicide offenses, commonly reject its approach 
to these mitigations and excuses?7 And it is not just a matter of the Model 
Penal Code's persuasiveness with the state codification commissions. Even 
some states that initially followed the Model Penal Code on a doctrine later 
abandoned it in favor of a more narrow formulation.Z8 I take this to be an 
illustration of the unfortunate distortion effect of American crime politics, 
which makes all mitigation and excuse defenses attractive targets, even if they 
may be essential to avoiding injustice and are perceived as essential by the 
shared intuitions of the state's voters.29 
II. THE INTERRELATION AMONG THE DOCTRINES 
These three doctrines obviously deal with related conditions of mental or 
emotional dysfunction or disturbance, and it would not be a surprise if they 
24. See infra Table 7. 
25. See infra Table 7. 
26. See generally infra Table 7 (listing New Hampshire as an "H" pattern, even though its insanity 
defense is different from the Model Penal Code 's formulation, because it may well be a bit broader in 
practice). 
27. For example, both Pennsylvania and Texas reject the Model Penal Code formulations for insanity, 
MINOE, and provocation/EMED, but follow the Model Penal Code homicide formulation. See 18 PA. STAT. 
ANN. § 2501 (West 2014); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.01 (West 2011); infra Table 7 (showing 
Pennsylvania's pattern (!2, M2, P2) and Texas ' s pattern (12, Ml, P2)). 
28. MODEL PENAL CODE§ 4.01 n.31 (1962) (showing, for example, that Alabama, Missouri, Texas, 
and Utah all had "provisions substantially modeled on Section 4.0 I" in 1985). But each state subsequently 
narrowed their insanity formulation by dropping its control prong. ALA. CODE§ 13A-3-l(a) (1988); MO. 
ANN. STAT.§ 562.086 (West 2014); TEX. PENAL CODE. ANN.§ 8.0 l(a) (West 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-2-305 (West 2014). Regarding provocation, for example, both Maine and New Jersey punished 
homicide that would be murder if not for "extreme emotional disturbance" as manslaughter. MODEL PENAL 
CODE§ 2 10.3 n.24 (1962). But both states now use language invoking the common-law provocation defense, 
allowing the defense when a crime that would otherwise be murder is committed "in the heat of passion 
resulting from a reasonable provocation" or "under the influence of extreme anger or extreme fear brought 
about by adequate provocation." ME. REv. STAT. tit. 17-A, § 203 (2014}; N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 2C:ll-4 (West 
2014). 
29. See Paul H. Robinson et a l., The Disutility of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1940, 1975-94 (2010) 
(discussing how the democratic process can produce liability rules that society sees as seriously unjust); Paul 
H. Robinson et al., The Modern Irrationalities of American Criminal Codes: An Empirical Study of Offense 
Grading, 100 J. CR!M. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 709--{}4 (2010); Paul H. Robinson eta!., Report on Offense 
Grading in New Jersey (University of Pennsylvania Law School20 II), available at http://papers.ssm.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= l737825; Paul H. Robinson, Report on Offense Grading in Pennsylvania 
(University of Pennsylvania Law School 2010), available at http:l/papers.ssm.corn/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1527149. 
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overlapped in some way. Because there is so much diversity in approach, it 
would seem that all manner of overlaps, or gaps, are possible. As the tables 
above show, there are at least four general approaches to formulating the 
insanity defense, three approaches to formulating the MINOE doctrine, and 
three approaches to formulating provocation/EMED.30 And, as the tables 
below make clear, these formulations occur in a host of combinations-eleven 
different combinations of insanity by MINOE, nine different combinations of 
insanity by EMED, and seven different combinations of MINOE by 
EMED.31 As noted above, there are eighteen different three-way 
combinations. 32 
Are there discernable patterns to the combinations of approaches that a 
jurisdiction takes on these three issues? If so, is there some logic to the 
patterns? Legislatures, courts, and scholars sometimes make claims or 
assumptions about how the doctrines interact with one another. For example, it 
is sometimes argued that a particular formulation of one doctrine is appropriate 
because of the existence or breadth of another doctrine. Thus, it has been 
argued that we can abolish the insanity defense because MINOE is available to 
provide a defense for mental illness,33 and conversely, that MINOE is an 
insufficient substitute for an insanity defense, 34 and that we do not need and 
should not have a control prong in an insanity defense because the provocation 
defense already takes such matters into account. 35 In other instances, a court or 
a legislature may define the scope of one doctrine by excluding from it 
situations covered by another. 36 For example, the insanity defense has been 
defined to exclude the conditions traditionally associated with provocation.37 In 
still other instances, scholars have analyzed whether there are constitutional 
limits to adopting a position on one doctrine according to the position the 
jurisdiction takes on another. 38 
Are there, then, discernible patterns to the position a jurisdiction takes on 
the three doctrines, and is there a logic in the patterns? These are particularly 
interesting questions to criminal law scholars who would like their logical 
30. See supra Tables 1-3. 
31. See infra Tables 4-6. 
32 . See infra Table 7. 
33. See. e.g., Raymond L. Spring, The End of Insanity, 19 WASHBURN L.J. 23, 32 (1979). 
34. See, e.g., Marc Rosen, Insanity Denied: Abolition of the Insanity Defense in Kansas, 8 KAN. J.L. & 
PUB. POL'Y 253,260--61 (1999). 
35. See, e.g., Stephen J. Morse, Retaining a Modified Insanity Defense, 477 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
Soc. SCI. (THE INSANITY DEFENS E) 137, 142-43 (1985) ("The criminal law already allows excuses or 
mitigation for control problems-for example, duress and the provocation/passion formula to reduce murder 
to manslaughter."). 
36. See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. 
37. See, e.g., Thompson v. Commonwealth, 70 S.E.2d 284, 292 (Va. 1952) ("Frenzy arising solely from 
the passion of anger and jealousy, regardless of how furious , is not insanity." (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
38. See, e.g., Tyler Ellis, Mental Illness, Legal Culpability, & the Four/eenth Amendment: Why Due 
Process Allows States to Choose a Mens Rea Insanity Defense over a M 'NaghtenApproach (2014), available 
at http://papers.ssm.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2390294. 
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arguments and analyses to have real world effects. Consider each of the three 
doctrines in pair with one another, then we will look at the variety of three-way 
combinations. 39 
A. Insanity and MJNOE 
Consider the interrelation of the insanity and MINOE formulations in 
Table 4. 
Table 4. Insanity x MINOE 
NY 
CA, lA, NE, NC, 
PA, SD 
CO, MO, NJ, OH, WA 
Some cells seem to have some logic to them. The cell in the 
upper-right-hand comer contains states that give the broadest insanity 
formulation as well as the broadest MINOE formulation, following the Model 
Penal Code ' s lead in both respects. They seem to show a consistent approach: 
wanting a full and broad assessment of an offender's blameworthiness. 
The states in the lower-right-hand comer have abolished the insanity 
defense, so one would think that they hardly have a choice other than to provide 
a fairly robust MINOE doctrine. But note the resistance ofNorth Dakota to this 
reasoning: it abolishes insanity but also limits MINOE.40 Similarly, the states 
in the upper-left-hand comer, having barred any MINOE, may have felt 
compelled to give a fairly broad insanity defense. 
But then come the many states in the lowest-populated left-hand corner, 
which not only bar any MINOE, but also allow the most narrow formulation of 
an insanity defense: the bare M'Naghten rule. Clearly they are suspicious of, if 
not hostile to the idea of mental illness mitigating or excusing liability. There 
is rich literature on such suspicions, but it would seem difficult for a state to 
claim to be committed to the principle of justice when it acts upon such 
suspicions in this way.41 
39. See infra Tables 4-7. 
40. See N.D.CENT. CODEANN. § 12.1-04.1-01 (West2013). 
41. See, e.g. , Michael L. Perlin, "The Borderline Which Separated You From Me ": The Insanity 
Defense, the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of Punishment, 82IOWA L. REv. 1375, 
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So there might seem to be some logic to the placement of jurisdictions in 
one cell or another, but those lines of argument are contradictory with one 
another. Do the states sharing a cell really reflect this shared point of view, or 
is the pattern one sees in the table just a product of essentially disconnected 
formulation decisions producing a somewhat random distribution in which, by 
chance, most cells get filled? 
B. Insanity and Provocation/EMED (Extreme Mental or Emotional 
Disturbance) 
Consider the interrelation of the insanity and provocation formulations in 
Table 5. 
Table 5. Insanity x Provocation/EMED 
AR, CT, KY, OR HI, NH, MPC 
DE, NY 
EMED and EED are so generally rejected that there is not much 
interactive effect to speculate about, but there are a few interesting 
points. Every state that follows the common law's M'Naghten rule for insanity 
also rejects any broadening of provocation from its common-law form. This 
trend is perhaps no surprise.42 Most of these states never had a modem 
recodification based upon the Model Penal Code.43 Showing the same logic, 
the states that go the farthest in following the Model Penal Code's broadening 
of insanity (to include a control prong) are also the states most likely to adopt 
the Model Penal Code's EMED or EED broadening of provocation. 
1377, 1390-91 (1997); William French Smith, Limiting the Insanity Defense: A Rational Approach to 
Irrational Crimes, 47 Mo. L. REV. 605, 606--11 (1982). 
42. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, Can a Model Penal Code Second Save the States 
from Themselves?, I OHIO ST. J . CRIM. L. 169, 169-70 (2003). See generally Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years 
of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 CALIF. L. REv. 943, 948- 50 (1999) (recognizing that not all of 
the reforms after the Proposed Final Draft of the Model Penal Code were equally reformative). 
43. See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
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In searching for a silver lining, one might observe that the chart shows a 
certain consistency in approach. It suggests that a state's formulations are not 
the product of a completely random process without rhyme or reason. On the 
other hand, one might wonder about the dynamics of the lower-right-hand 
cells- North Dakota, Utah, Montana, and Nevada. These states have abolished 
the insanity defense, yet followed the Model Penal Code's broadening of 
common-law provocation.44 It is not obvious that there is a logical reason that 
would tie these two positions together. Perhaps we are back to randomness in 
effect. Or perhaps there is a structural-process effect at work here rather than 
the effect of a reasoned explanation.45 One might speculate that the 
"small-state" effect is at work in these four states, leading them to follow the 
Model Penal Code's broader EMED or EED, but because insanity is a 
high-profile defense, it is one of the few issues that would attract attention and 
provoke political debate, leading to its abolition.46 Note too that the four states 
are geographically close, which creates the possibility that debates in one state 
may spill over to have an effect next door. 
C. MINOE and Provocation/EMED (Extreme Mental or Emotional 
Disturbance) 
Consider the interrelation of the provocation and MINOE doctrines in 
Table 6. 
MINOE: 
Table 6. Provocation/EMED x MINOE 
DE 
AL, AZ,DC, 
FL, GA, IL, LA, 
MI , MN,MS, 
OK, SC, TX, 
VA, WI 
KY, NY, ND 
CA,IA,MA, 
NE,NC, NM, 
P A, Rl, SO, WY 
AR, CT, OR, UT 
AK, CO, Federal, 
ID, IN, KS, ME, 
MD, MO, NJ, OH, 
TN, VT, WA, WV 
The lower-left-hand cell contains jurisdictions that reject both the Model 
Penal Code's attempt to broaden common-law provocation and its attempt to 
allow the introduction of mental illness evidence that would negate a required 
offense element. Most of these states never codified or recodified their criminal 
44. See supra Table 5. 
45. See generally infra Part ill (discussing the "small-state" effect). 
46. See infra Part III. 
2014] MURDER MITIGATION 31 
law during the wave of the 1960s and 1970s.47 The lower-right-hand cell kept 
common-law provocation, as most states did, yet adopted full MINOE per the 
Model Penal Code-an interesting combination of views. 
The two upper-right-hand cells are even more interesting, but for a 
different reason. They follow the Model Penal Code in providing both full 
MINOE and broad EMED or at least EED. It is perhaps no surprise, then, that 
five of the eight states also adopt the broader insanity formulation, recognizing 
a control prong as the Model Penal Code does. But the other three-Montana, 
Nevada, and Utah-abolish the insanity defense altogether! There is no middle 
ground. 
What is going on here? Why only the extremes? One could speculate, 
with no real evidence, that this is an example of the small-state effect, where 
these eight states all dutifully followed the Model Penal Code, but in three of 
the states, the insanity defense caught the spotlight and ended up getting the 
full public-panic treatment.48 Why in those three states and not the other 
five? Perhaps we see here a certain randomness in the criminal lawmaking 
process, including the effect of timing, local news coverage, local politics, and 
other such special factors unrelated to logical analysis. 
D. States Sharing the Same Approach to All Three Doctrines 
The variety of combinations that one sees in the two-way tables above, as 
one might guess, is even more exaggerated when one looks at the variety of 
three-way combinations. Table 7 shows the eighteen different patterns. 
47. Robinson & Cahill, supra note 42. 
48. See supra Table I. 
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Table 7. Summary of Three-Way Combinations 
Ml-none 
Ml- none A 
M3 - an B 
M3 -an B 
M3-an B 
M3-an B 
itive M3-an B 
Ml-none c 
Ml-none c 
Ml-none c 
Ml- none c 
Ml- none c 
Ml- none c 
Ml-none c 
M l - none c 
Ml - none c 
Ml- none c 
M3-an D 
M3 -an D 
M3-an D 
M3 -an P2-CL E 
M3 -an P2-CL E 
M3 -an P2 -CL E 
M3 -an P2-CL E 
M3 -an P2-CL E 
Ml - none P2-CL rov F 
Ml - none P2-CL F 
Ml - none P2 -CL F 
itive G 
P4 -EMED H 
M3 -an P4-EMED H 
M3 -an P4-EMED H 
M3 -an P2-CL rov I 
M3-an P2-CL rov I 
M2 -on! intent P2-CL rov J 
M2 - onl intent P2-CL rov J 
M2 - on! intent P2-CL rov J 
M2 - onl intent P2-CL rov J 
M2 -on! intent P2 -CL rov J 
M2-onl intent P2-CL rov J 
M2-onl intent K 
M3 -an P2-CL rov L 
M3 -an P2-CL rov L 
M3-an P2-CL rov L 
M2-onl intent P2-CL rov M 
M2-onl intent P2-CL rov M 
M2 - onl intent P2-CL rov M 
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Key to Table 7: 
From Table 1 (Insanity) : 
14 -control = cognitive and control prongs 
13 -ALI cognitive= cognitive only "does not appreciate" or "lacks 
substantial appreciation," etc. 
12- M'Naghten = cognitive only "does not know" 
11 - abolition = no insanity defense 
From Table 2 (MJNOE): 
M3 -any= negates whatever culpability is applicable 
M2- only intent= negates only intention (e.g., murder) 
Ml -none= mental illness cannot negate an offense element 
From Table 3 (Provocation!EMED): 
P4 - EMED = MPC broader form including mental disturbance 
P3 - EED = MPC version 
P2 - CL prov = "heat of passion," etc. 
In Table 7, the states that share the same approach to all three doctrines 
share the same letter in the far right column. The level of diversity is 
striking. Eighteen different combinations of approaches exist (A through 
R). The most common pattern is C, with ten states following it. After that, the 
largest group consists of six states sharing a pattern (J), five states sharing two 
patterns (Band E), and five groups of three states sharing different patterns (D, 
F, H, L, and M). Finally, three pairs of states share a pattern (A, I, and N), and 
another six states have a unique combination (Delaware, Kentucky, New 
Mexico, New York, North Dakota, and Utah). 
The single largest group, pattern C, consists of states that tend to follow 
the common-law rule, unaffected by the Model-Penal-Code-based recodifi-
cations. They adopt the most narrow formulation of each of the three doctrines. 
Beyond that, the states are seriously splintered in their approaches. One 
might conclude that the Model Penal Code did have an effect, not so much in 
gaining adherents to its formulations, but at least in pushing most states from 
their strict reliance upon the common-law approach- usually to some place 
short of the Model Penal Code position. 
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III. CONCLUSION 
What conclusions can one draw from this analysis of the state approaches 
to these three doctrines: insanity, MINOE, and provocation!EMED? Several 
points have already been hinted at. 
First, there is an astounding level of diversity among the American 
jurisdictions regarding the approaches to each doctrine (Tables 1 through 3) 
and among the different combinations of approaches taken to the three 
doctrines (Tables 4 through 6)--most of the cells in the latter tables are 
populated.49 And from Table 7 we see that, on average, a state shares its 
pattern of formulation of these doctrines with only 3. 7 other jurisdictions of the 
fifty-two. 50 
The common-law view might seem a strong, unifying view, at least among 
a minority group, but this conclusion is a bit of an illusion. 51 While these 
jurisdictions are close enough to one another in their formulations to be 
grouped together in our tables (because they are dependent upon judicial 
formulation and development) they in fact have many differences among them, 
albeit ofless dramatic effect than their differences with the Model-Penal-Code-
influenced jurisdictions. 
A second conclusion is that the analysis destroys any pleasant illusion 
some scholars might have had about the controlling effect of the Model Penal 
Code on these doctrines. The Model Penal Code has had an enormous effect in 
some areas, but these mitigations and excuses are an area in which it gained 
few converts. The Model Penal Code represents the minority view on each of 
the doctrines: only twenty-three of the fifty-two jurisdictions follow it on 
MINOE, only sixteen on insanity, and only twelve on EMED or EED.52 
A third conclusion follows from the perspective the survey gives on the 
influences on criminal law legislation. Consider, for example, what was 
referred to previously as the small-state effect. 53 It would seem that the Model 
Penal Code had a greater effect with these doctrines on the smaller states (by 
population). Note that such states are quite overrepresented in the 
upper-right-hand cells of Tables 1 through 6 (which always contain the broad 
Model Penal Code view). 54 This makes sense when one considers the common 
dynamics of the recodification process in the states. Smaller states presumably 
have smaller legislative staffs and reform budgets and may have less legislative 
activity generally. If they are able to successfully process legislation as 
gargantuan as a new criminal code, they may only be able to do so by largely 
49. See supra Tables 1-6. 
50. 10x9 (10 states share with 9 others)+ 6x5 + !Ox4 + 14x2 + 6xl + 6x0 = 194/52 = 3.7. See supra 
Table 7. 
51. See supra Tables 1-3. 
52. See supra Tables 1-3. 
53 . See supra Part II. 
54. See supra Tables 1-6. 
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following the model, with their legislative changes to the model limited to 
particularly prominent issues that happen to catch their attention. 
Note that some small states were never able to enact a new code. 55 Thus, 
the small-state distribution is a bit bimodal: either they enacted a code heavily 
influenced by the Model Penal Code or they failed to enact a modem 
recodification. 
The large, populous states as a group show a different dynamic. Lots of 
legislative activity and lobbyist interest in debating, or blocking codification 
formulations they do not support, produced codes that were much more likely 
to alter the model. The big-state fights also produced their own share of 
failures to enact a modem criminal code, even after an enormous inve·stment of 
time and effort. The repeated failures to recodify federal criminal law is the 
most dramatic example, but failures occurred in the states as well, as with 
California, Massachusetts, and Michigan. 56 Notice that many of the states that 
regularly appear in the cells taking the most narrow approach are populous, 
such as California (1st in population among the fifty states, including the 
District of Columbia), Louisiana (25th), Oklahoma (28th), South Carolina 
(24th), and Wisconsin (20th). None of these five states successfully recodified 
their criminal laws during the wave sparked by the Model Penal Code. 57 
Are most jurisdictions, in reaching their formulation decisions, making 
carefully reasoned analyses that take into account what they have done in other 
related doctrines? Scholars attempting to divine the underlying reason for a 
state's pattern of formulations may have to face the disappointing reality that 
there is often no underlying logic. How else can one explain the dizzying array 
of different combinations? 
It may be that the formulation is as much a product of chance as 
logic. Did a headline case spark public unhappiness on an issue, as with the 
Hinckley insanity acquittal? What kind of debates are neighboring jurisdictions 
having, and do the states share media sources? What other codifications were 
complete when the state undertook its recodification? What kind of political 
compromises were needed to reach agreement on a formulation? All of these 
factors are independent of the wisdom and rationality of the resulting 
formulation. 
55. For example, Nevada, West Virginia, Idaho, Rhode Island , the District of Columbia, and Vermont 
have never enacted a modem codification of their criminal law, although many of them have at one point or 
another thought seriously about it. See supra Tables 1-7. 
56. See JOINT LEGIS. COMM. FOR REVISION PENAL CODE, P ENAL CODE REVISION DRAFT, TENTATIVE 
DRAFT NO. I (Cal. 1967); MASS. CRIM. L. REVISION COMM., PROPOSED CRJMINAL CODE OF 
MASSACHUSETTS WITH COMMISSION NOTES (Mass. 1972); SPECIAL COMM. MICH. ST. B. FOR REVISION 
CRJM. CODE, MICHIGAN REVISED CRJMINAL CODE, FINAL DRAFT (Mich. 1967); NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM 
OF F ED. CRI:M. LAWS, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM FEDERAL CRIMINAL 
LAWS: A PROPOSED NEW FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE (1971), available at http://www.ndcourts.gov/court/ 
Resource/Crimina!Code/Fina!Report. pdf. 
57 . See Herbert Wechsler, Forward to MODEL PENAL CODE: OFFICIAL DRAFT AND EXPLANATORY 
NOTES, at xi ( 1985) (listing all jurisdictions that enacted criminal code reform after promulgation of the 
Model Penal Code, as well as a number of jurisdictions that tried and failed). 
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Yes, one can discern some states that tend to be generally more 
sympathetic to these mitigations and excuses-see the upper-right-hand cells in 
Tables 4 through 6-and some states that seem generally hostile to these 
mitigations and excuses- see the bottom-left-hand cells in Tables 4 through 
6- but, beyond that, there are many combinations for which there seems little 
rhyme or reason. 
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